hese are two memos that CalRCV supplied to the LA Charter Reform Commission. It has the mapping data and charts that the Civic Assembly needs as context for this issue
Please use the slide on Page 7, which projects solid and influence districts for council models from 23 to 33 single-seat districts 9 and 11 three-seat districts
On Page 6, the following text summarizes what that chart says
The following slides shows the Summary of Simulation Results, comparing Single-Member Districts of 21, 23, 25, 27, 31 and 33 seats to nine and 11
Multi-Member Districts of 27 seats (nine three-seats districts) and 33 seats (11 three-seat districts)
● We averaged results from 10,000 simulated maps across multiple district structures, including Single-Member Districts (SMDs) and
Multi-Member Districts (MMDs).
● Single-Member Districts consistently limit minority influence:
○ API voters have at most influence over 1 seat under SMDs—and often none.
○ Black voters have at most influence over 2 seats under SMDs.
● Multi-Member Districts substantially increase representation:
○ API voters are likely to influence 4–5 seats under MMDs.
○ Black voters are likely to influence 3–4 seats under MMDs.
● Latino and White representation remains relatively stable across SMD and MMD plans.
Bottom line: Multi-Member Districts consistently produce outcomes that better reflect Los Angeles’ demographic and political diversity,
while Single-Member Districts systematically constrain representation for minority and non-majority groups
(2) This second memo has a text version summarizing the charts. In particular it charts how limiting it is for AAPI and Black representatives to use single seat districts.
These are the three findings this document
Finding #1 - Multi-seat districts provide fuller representation for protected classes of minority voters
under the California Voting Rights Act, compared to under single-seat districts , when the redistricting
process follows redistricting requirements under the Federal Voting Rights Act and the LA City Charter
Redistricting Criteria:
MED averaged results from 10,000 simulated maps across multiple district structures, and found
● Single-Seat Districts consistently limit minority influence. On average:
○ API voters have at most influence over 1 seat under SMDs—and often none.
○ Black voters have at most influence over 2 seats under SMDs.
● Multi-Seat Districts substantially increase representation. On average:
○ API voters are likely to influence 4–5 seats under MMDs.
○ Black voters are likely to influence 3–4 seats under MMDs.
● Latino and White representation remains relatively stable across SMD and MMD plans, with
small variations depending upon the total number of seats
Finding #2 - Even if single-seat districts are gerrymandered to an extreme in order to maximize voting
strength for either Black or AAPI voters at the expense of most other redistricting considerations –
something which would not occur in the real world – Black and AAPI voters are still less able to elect (or
influence the election of) candidates of their choice under single-seat districts than under the same
number of multi-seat districts elected by PRCV. Even in three-seat PRCV districts that include substantial
numbers of Latino and/or White voters, this lower threshold creates more meaningful opportunities for
Black and AAPI voters to elect candidates of their choice.
Black - For Black representation, even when drawing as many as 33 seats to maximize Black voter voting
strength, at best three 46% Black districts could be drawn. But in one Black voters would still be
outnumbered by 50% Latino voters and in another, Latino voters would make up a nearly equivalent
43%, as per the charter below. Note: In gerrymandering districts to maximize Black voting strength, one
exception was made, to not break up Koreatown and Chinatown, so as not to pit Black vs. AAPI voting
strength in such examples.
By comparison, in a City Council elected from 11 three-seat PRCV districts, again with a win-threshold of
25% + 1, Black voters would have a better chance to elect or influence the election of more seats. By
comparison, in a City Council elected from 11 three-seat PRCV districts, with a win threshold of 25% + 1,
Black voters would have three solid districts over that threshold, with 26%, 29% AND 27%.
In comparing City Councils of 27 seats, two strong Black districts of 52% and 50% could be drawn, with
corresponding Latino populations of 42% and 40%, as per the chart below. By comparison, in a City
Council elected from nine three-seat PRCV districts, with a win threshold of 25% + 1, Black voters would
have one solid district with 25% and two more just under that threshold, with 24%.
AAPI - For AAPI representation, even when drawing as many as 33 seats, at best, a single 41% AAPI
district can be created that is also 30% Latino. The next two highest percentage AAPI districts would also
have larger Latino and White pluralities than the AAPI total. Thus in a best case scenario, AAPI would get
only one strong influence district. By comparison, in a City Council elected from 11 three-seat PRCV
districts, with a win threshold of 25% + 1, AAPI voters would make up one solid 25% district and two
more strong influence districts of 24% and 20%.
In comparing City Councils of 27 seats, the maximum AAPI district would be 38% CVAP, followed by
Latino 31% CVAP, meaning one strong AAPI influence district. In the next two largest AAPI
concentrations of 25% CVAP and 24% CVAP, the AAPI population would be second largest, following 43%
Latino and 41% white. By comparison, in a City Council elected from nine three-seat PRCV districts,
again with a win-threshold of 25% + 1, AAPI would again have one solid district with 26% of voters and
two more influence districts (in the 15% to 25% range) of 20% and 19%.
Finding #3 - While ensuring that under the redistricting process, California’s protected classes of racial
minority voters have the ability to elect candidates of their choice, at the same time most voters do not
vote exclusively or even primarily only upon race, but upon a range of issues and political perspectives.
Under winner-take-all single-seat districts, various political/issue constituencies voting upon a range of
issues surrounding development and land use, social services, public safety, homelessness, parks and
recreation, the arts and others, and to different groups of voters like renters and others may have little
chance of winning a seat. By eliminating winner-take-all dynamics and allowing proportional
representation of politically diverse groups, three-seat PRCV districts can better translate meaningful
vote shares into actual seats
Attachment: Page 2 of first memo has this table of contents
Section 1: Executive Summary
Page 5 Explanation of Redistricting Simulation Methodology
Page 5 Summary of Simulation Results, comparing Single-Member Districts and Multi-Member Districts
Page 6 Summary of Data, Estimated Representation by Race by District Plan, comparing Single-Member Districts
and Multi-Member districts
Section 2: Single-member districts analysis
Pages 8-22 Analysis of 33 single-member districts
Pages 23-33 Analysis of 31 single-member districts
Pages 34- 43 Analysis of 27 single-member districts
Pages 45-59 Analysis of 25 single-member districts
Pages 60-70 Analysis of 23 single-member districts
Section 3: Multi-member districts analysis
Pages 71-89 Analysis of eleven three-seat districts, total of 33 seats
Pages 90-109 Analysis of nine three-seat districts, total of 27 seats
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